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Abstract 
 At all times the majority of directors, which desired to properly 
perform and develop activities on behalf of a company in a competitive 
market, were raising relevant questions on how to control a company aiming 
to guarantee and ensure its financial viability and competitiveness, what is 
the line between the freedom of decision-making and personal liability 
therefore, are the directors equally as the shareholders protected under the 
limited liability doctrine? The prevailing opinion is that principle of limited 
liability protects shareholders and only shareholders from liability. 
Therefore, in this study the authors explore this premise from the perspective 
of the doctrinal implications of immunising directors from personal liability 
for their actions, when managing company’s affairs. 
The authors’ principal conclusions are that the limited liability doctrine 
should be applied not only to the shareholders, but also in respect of the 
directors. Such legal protection from the liability could be withdrawn, when 
a director commits illegal acts that cause damages to a company or to 
creditors thereof. In respect of creditors the liability of such director shall 
still be considered subsidiary, whereas a direct liability of the director may 
only arise against a company until its liquidation and only after the 
completion of liquidation proceedings – against the creditors whose claims 
remained unsatisfied. 
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Introduction 
 The fundamental attribute of company’s legal personality from which 
indeed all other consequences flow is that the company is a legal entity 
distinct from its shareholders. Hence it is capable of enjoying rights and of 
being subject to duties which are not the same as those enjoyed or borne by 
its shareholders. Therefore, in the absence of express provision to the 
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contrary the shareholders will be completely free from any personal liability 
for the company’s debts. In principle, a private company with liability 
limited by shares offers shareholder protection by limiting liability to the 
nominal value of their shares. This means that while a private company may 
incur liability in excess of its assets, ordinarily, shareholder liability extends 
only to the nominal value of the shares. Public policy has dictated certain and 
limited exceptions to the principle (referred to collectively as instances of 
“piercing the corporate veil”). Where the corporate veil is pierced, 
shareholders may be pursued for the liabilities of a company beyond the 
nominal value of their shares. For example, the Lithuanian piercing of 
corporate veil provision is stipulated in the Civil Code of the Republic of 
Lithuania (the “Civil Code”), indicating that the shareholders of the company 
are subsidiary liable (for the company’s obligations) in situations where the 
company may not settle with its creditors because of the unfair acts of its 
shareholders. Hence the principle of separate legal personality is assumed to 
be principally about protecting investment of shareholders in the business. 
Thus, it is the shareholders and only shareholders who may hide behind the 
veil of incorporation and there is no single opinion in any scientific literature 
with regard to the question, whether the company’s directors shall be also 
entitled to such limited liability defense. 
 Nowadays legal systems are seeking to protect companies from 
unlawful decisions of the directors and to oblige to take the personal liability 
for them. However, determination of strict liability standards for the adopted 
decisions would decrease their effectiveness and would limit the 
development of activities of the companies, as well as development of the 
state economy, because the directors would try to avoid innovations, and 
conversely, would try not to invest and take responsibility. However, in case 
the directors would not be subject to legal liability for the damages incurred 
due to their decisions made, that would increase the risk that the directors 
would adopt unlawful decisions. 
 Therefore, in this study we will consider whether and to what extent 
the principle of limited liability is or could be applicable to the company 
directors, by analysing the need of application of limited liability doctrine in 
respect of directors and determining on what legal basis directors are liable 
to the company and creditors for their illegal acts, which caused the damage. 
 
The Limits of Limited Liability for Company Directors 
 As it was mentioned above, in a broad sense, the company’s limited 
liability doctrine means that the satisfaction of the third parties’ claims is 
limited to the extent of the company’s assets (Art. 2.50(1) of the Civil Code). 
The main purpose of the applicability of limited liability doctrine is related to 
the development of a business friendly legal environment, also national 
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economy expansion, upon encouraging individuals to invest their financial 
and human capital to the company’s activities without any potential risk to 
lose their own wealth. However, this defense of limited liability doctrine at 
the same time may establish favorable conditions for certain fraudulent 
activities of the company’s shareholders or management body members in 
respect to the company’s creditors, since without having any fears to lose 
their personal property, they may initiate or implement too risky projects, 
start wasting company’s assets, etc. (Resolution of Supreme Court of 
Lithuania adopted in civil case No. 3K-3-581/2013, 2013). For these reasons, 
in order to reduce such risk of abusing company’s limited liability, in the 
different legal systems around the world, a wide range of measures of 
various nature and scope, aimed at protecting the creditor’s rights and legal 
interests are being enforced, for instance, subsidiary liability of the 
company’s shareholders for the loss of creditors incurred due to unfair 
actions thereof, fiduciary duties of the management body members towards 
the creditors in case of insolvency of a company, rules of capital adequacy 
and so on. 
 Since the doctrine of a company’s limited liability was created 
exclusively for the legal protection of shareholders’ interests, there is no 
single opinion in any scientific literature with regard to the question, whether 
the company’s management body members shall be also entitled to such 
defense on limitation of their liability. According to L. P. Davies, limited 
liability doctrine shall provide the same legal protection to the property of 
the company’s management body members who act in the name of and on 
behalf of a company, as it is being applied to the shareholders’ assets 
(Davies, 2002). The same position has been followed also in practice of 
Supreme Court of Lithuania (Resolution adopted in civil case No. 3K-3-
19/2012, 2012) and the legal doctrine (Tikniūtė, 2006; etc.). It is being 
argued, that such extension of legal defense in favor of the company’s 
directors is not in any way incompatible with the fundamental doctrinal 
functions set forth at the company law (Grantham, 2007), according to which 
only the company itself shall be deemed liable for contracts concluded in the 
name thereof or any torts committed on its behalf (Reynolds, 2006, pp. 99). 
It is recognized that the management body members as much as shareholders 
invest their wealth in the company; therefore, same as shareholders, they 
should also risk only the invested portion of their wealth. “In the case of 
shareholders that wealth takes the form of financial capital. In the case of 
directors, the wealth invested takes the form of human capital” (Grantham, 
2007). This human capital, which consists of respective skills, technical 
know-how, management expertise and general income earning potential, 
might be considered as very specific and thus not easily re-invested 
elsewhere (Glynn, 2004). Furthermore, the human capital by its nature is 
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hardly diversified, as for „most executive directors, it is impossible as a 
matter of practicality to invest in developing firm-specific skills and know-
how in a number of different businesses at the same time (Grantham, 2007). 
Thus, both shareholders and directors incur risk of losing direct investments 
in the event of company’s business failure. Without being granted limited 
liability defense, shareholders would avoid to invest their financial capital 
into the company, same as directors – to use their human capital for the 
purposes of certain risky projects that could lead to their personal liability 
(Cheffins, 2002). As well, fear of personal liability would encourage 
directors to invest more into any available precautionary measures 
(Lacobucci, 2001), such as, civil liability insurance, monitoring activities, 
hiring external consultants and so on, which respectively would require a 
considerable portion of additional time and costs inputs. Furthermore, which 
could have a negative impact on prompt decision-making and, accordingly, 
this could threaten company’s abilities to exhaust any and all available 
options to develop its business. 
 Applicability of limited liability doctrine in respect to the company’s 
directors is being criticized by emphasizing that it would undermine an 
existing stable balance between risks and obligations that it is now supported 
by imposing directors’ personal liability (Mendelson, 2002). It is also being 
argued that the limited liability of shareholders could encourage them to 
engage into more risky investment strategies and, if it is not being restricted 
in such way, this may lead to too much of the risk being externalized to 
creditors and other groups, and respectively, result in increase of net social 
costs, while director’s personal liability could serve as a pragmatic constraint 
towards such shareholders’ moral hazard (Glynn, 2004). Even though these 
arguments are indeed weighty, but still they do create certain doubts. In 
particular, if excessive risk taking is certainly a negative side relating to the 
limited liability, it is not very clear, why applicability of unlimited liability in 
respect to the company’s directors is considered as the most sophisticated 
solution of this problem. As was already mentioned, unlimited liability may 
have an impact towards the director’s sub-optimal decision making, which 
accordingly may have negative impact on the company’s entire business 
development. But having in mind, that the aforementioned balance has to be 
kept, it is unclear, why a waiver of director’s limited liability is considered as 
the best measure for such balance support. Certainly this can be also 
achieved upon directly taking into account not only advantages attributed to 
the company as the most favorable form of business organization, but also 
upon enforcing other efficient legal protection measures, such as, for 
instance, the anticipation of director's personal liability for company’s debts 
when any transactions are being concluded in a state of company’s 
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insolvency, provided, it can be proven that such director knew that the 
company will not be able to settle payments towards the creditors, and so on. 
 Critics of limited liability doctrine also state that there are other more 
efficient legal measures that may ensure that the director is indemnified from 
incurring personal liability. One of such measures is a civil insurance that is 
being purchased and maintained by a company itself (Baxter, 1995). It is 
being argued that such type of insurance granted for directors is similar to 
the limited liability defense as it also indemnifies directors from personal 
liability against the third parties, by shifting that risk through the company to 
the insurer (Grantham, 2007). The question arises, whether such type of 
insurance or the applicability of limited liability doctrine could be more 
efficient measure when protecting directors from their personal liability. 
More likely that still the limited liability would be more effective legal 
measure, in particular, due to the fact that in such case certain additional 
costs would be avoided, for instance, such as transaction costs related to the 
insurance policy negotiations, ex post costs associated with the possible 
litigation procedures and notification costs, related to the company’s 
obligation towards the third parties to ensure that the director possesses 
required insurance coverage. Upon applying limited liability regime it would 
be clear that pursuant to the common rule the liability for obligations would 
fall on the company itself. Moreover, the empirical study of C. Baxter has 
shown that the civil liability insurance of the management body members in 
majority of cases has encouraged initiation of litigation proceedings, 
expecting the insurer to satisfy the respective claim in its entirety, unlike in 
other cases where the defendant was the individual director of the company 
(Baxter, 1995). Certainly, the main advantage of obtaining such insurance is 
the fact, that in the respective cases it is much more likely that victims of 
torts will receive applicable compensation of their losses (Finch, 2002); 
however, the aforementioned transaction costs still may mitigate such 
advantage. Moreover, the insurers usually are very active in litigation 
proceedings and exhaust all available measures to oppose the arguments 
stated in the claim (Baxter, 1995). Finally, it is also obvious that possession 
of such civil liability insurance might encourage the company’s director’s 
endeavors to engage into higher risk projects, and since the insurer may 
always monitor director’s actions and respectively reduce the scope of 
insurance applicability or increase insurance contributions, this respectively 
may negatively impact director’s efforts aimed at implementing more risky 
but beneficial projects for company’s development (Baxter, 1995). 
Moreover, directors may refuse to remain at such posts without having civil 
liability insurance and may start reasoning their business decisions based on 
the scope of protection guaranteed by the possessed insurance coverage 
instead of referring to the company’s business interests (Grantham, 2007). 
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 O. Kahn-Freund criticizes such option of applying limited liability 
principle in respect to management body members of a company, 
emphasizing, that in such way certain legal presumptions are being created, 
allowing to indemnify directors from their respective liability for unlawful 
actions, which they were directly in charge of, and, accordingly, such 
situation creates immoral connotations within the business world (Kahn-
Freund, 1994). The other authors support applicability of limited liability 
principle in favor of director only in case of creditor’s claims arising under 
the contracts, but they clearly state, that such limited liability defense in any 
way should not be applied in respect to the director’s liability arising in tort 
cases. Based on such authors, director must be personally liable for his 
committed torts, even if such actions were performed on behalf of a 
company, during enforcement of his managerial duties (Spender, 2005). 
However, we could agree with L. P. Davies’ opinion that torts committed by 
the management body members that are entitled to act on behalf of a 
company, in the course of performance of their duties on behalf of the 
company within the limits of their competence, should not incur any personal 
liability, because such actions thereof should be deemed as actions of a 
company and a company itself shall incur full liability for losses caused to 
any third person due to such actions (Davies, 2002). Personal liability of 
directors may arise only in the event of failure to comply with the 
aforementioned criteria. Thus, it can be concluded that limited liability 
defense shall be applicable on the management body members in respect to 
both – contractual and tortious liability (Grantham, 2007). 
 It shall be also drawn attention to the fact that seeking to define, 
whether directors may incur personal liability for the company’s obligations, 
courts in common law countries apply the following two key tests 
(Anderson, 2004). First of all, directors are held personally liable for their 
own unlawful acts, which cannot be assigned to the company actions (this 
test was applied in such cases as Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd, 
1997; Re Supply of Ready Mix Concrete; Revenue and Customs Comrs v 
Benton-Diggin, 1995; etc.). This test foresees that the director will be 
imposed liability for any tort committed on his own name, for instance, when 
deceptively acting through another company seeking to avoid payment of 
taxes imposed on his managed company, as well as for any actions 
performed in favor of his own interests or in any other unjust way (Ribstein, 
2002). Secondly, director would be held personally liable if he assumed such 
personal liability for company’s actions (this test was applied in such cases 
as (Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson, 1992; Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & 
Partners, 1964; etc.). For instance, in UK directors may be imposed personal 
liability in cases, where they personally guarantee for the implementation of 
company’s obligations under respective contract concluded with the third 
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parties (Static Control Components (Europe) Limited v Egan, 2004) or when 
a director did not explicitly indicate to such third persons that he was acting 
on behalf of a company but not in his own name. As well, it should be 
emphasized, that similar cases involving non-executive directors are less 
likely to occur, therefore, their personal liability for torts are very limited 
(Griffin, 1999). 
 In German company law it is determined the director’s liability for 
each culpable violation of his duties. Such duties may originate from a 
contract (articles of association or director’s employment contract) or from 
law (civil, corporate, criminal or insolvency law). A director’s liability may 
lead to damage claims from the company (so-called internal liability) or to 
damage claims of the company’s creditors or any third party negatively 
affected by tort (so-called ‘external liability’) (Loos, 2006). Managers may 
be imposed personal liability only in certain circumstances. For instance, 
when managers are acting in the name of a company, but do not notify or 
indicate such fact to the others or when the respective third party during the 
contract negotiation or signing procedures was acting in confidence in 
respect to one or several directors but he was not notified on the fact, that the 
company is currently deeply indebted and it would not be able to complete 
this transaction that will result in his further loss. Such liability for directors 
arises due to so called ‘fault in contracting’ (lat. culpa in contrahendo) 
(Lutter and Hommelhof, 2000). 
Under Belgium law, a respective theory of quasi-immunity of agents 
is being applied, pursuant to which the directors executing a contractual 
obligation of a company cannot be held personally liable on a tort basis, 
unless: (i) they violated the duty of due care and diligence; and (ii) the fault 
caused a damage other than the damage caused by the poor execution of the 
mandate. Third parties, including creditors and shareholders, can then hold 
directors personally liable for all damages suffered due to the violation of a 
specific legal provision or the general duty of due care and diligence 
(Nieuwdorp and Roeck, 2006). 
Pursuant to the Lithuanian law, such legal basis to apply civil liability 
in respect to the head of a company before the third parties has been 
established under Article 6.263 of the Civil Code thereof, where the general 
tort principle has been determined, establishing a common duty for a person 
to act carefully and with due diligence, in respect to unlimited number of the 
third parties. On the one hand, general tort principle is a provision, allowing 
to impose civil liability on a company’s director against the third parties, but, 
on the other hand, such unrestricted applicability of this principle can be 
dangerous to the entire system of company law, as each person, who claims 
that he allegedly suffered loss due to company’s director’s actions can be 
considered as a rightful claimant (Didžiulis, 2008). Therefore, the limits for 
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applying this principle in respect to the company’s director must be 
established by courts on case by case basis, since the company’s director 
liability towards the third parties may arise only in cases, when a company 
itself is not capable to satisfy such third party claims (Resolution of the 
Supreme Court of Lithuania adopted in civil case No. 3K-3-295/2008, 2008). 
This implies that the company’s director has a subsidiary liability in respect 
to the third party claims (Resolution of the Supreme Court of Lithuania 
adopted in civil case No. 3K-3-290/2013, 2013). Such liability is possible 
only when the director intentionally expresses his own will as a separate 
person, for instance, by issuing personal guarantees in respect to the 
company’s undertakings, but in such case, the head of the company would be 
liable as a separate independent natural person but not as the management 
body of a company. 
L. Doyle has a critical approach towards granting such rights for the 
creditor for submission of a direct lawsuit against the director of a company, 
because: 1) creditor may enforce all such available measures during 
company’s bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings; and 2) creditor possesses 
all options ex ante to assess the risks and benefits of concluded transactions 
and may demand from a company to enforce any available measures aimed 
for securing such obligations, for instance, such as mortgage, deed of 
guarantee, etc. (Doyle, 2010). 
Summarizing the aforementioned approach of scientists in respect to 
applicability of limited liability doctrine towards the directors, the following 
three groups based on the system of scientific theories indentified by L. 
Didžiulis may be determined: 1) repression theory, which supporters agree 
on determination of fiduciary duties in favor of creditors, because, firstly, 
such created loss shall be reimbursed by persons who are liable for causing 
thereof, secondly, a fear of personal liability might act as a powerful 
precautionary measure against the opportunistic behavior of directors; 
2) restriction theory, which supporters, in opposite, state that (i) corporate 
law shall take care for safeguarding the shareholders’ interests as a whole 
(first of all, maximization of profit), while the protection of creditors’ rights 
shall remain subject to the provisions of a bankruptcy law, which general is 
enforced for the purpose of management of such critical situations and 
identifying of possible solutions; (ii) responsibility of directors to protect 
creditors’ interests distorts the structure of stock ownership, which represents 
the idea, that the economical owners of a company are the respective 
participants thereof, and this contradicts to the principle of inviolability of a 
private property; (iii) a fear of civil liability may cause the director to 
become too precautious, which is obviously not compatible with one of the 
key business elements – such as risk; and 3) limited liability theory, which 
supporters states, that creditors should not initiate lawsuits against directors, 
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because the respective creditors, before entering into contractual relations 
with the company, have all possibilities to assess risks of their possible 
unsatisfied claims (Didžiulis, 2008). 
We do support the view, that limited liability doctrine shall be 
applicable not only in respect to shareholders of a company, but also towards 
management body members thereof. However, such liability defense against 
the company could be lost in the event of tort, committed in breach of 
respective competencies or determined duties of such management body 
member. Respectively, in majority of countries around the world, it is 
allowed for the creditors to impose certain personal liability on the 
management body members when a company becomes insolvent – this issue 
will be more precisely analyzed in further sections hereunder. 
 
Impact of Doctrines of “Liability for Delaying Insolvency Proceedings” 
and “Deepening Insolvency” Towards a Legal Status of Company 
Directors 
In scientific literature there are distinguished two currently globally 
dominant legal doctrines, based on which it is being grounded the imposition 
of a civil liability on directors before the creditors, when a company becomes 
insolvent 32 . These are doctrine of ‘liability for delaying insolvency 
proceedings’ and doctrine of ‘deepening insolvency’ (Schillig, 2009 and 
2010). 
Doctrine of ‘liability for delaying insolvency proceedings’ is widely 
used and applied in the civil law countries. Initial sources in applying such 
doctrine might be found in Germany, where this doctrine was applied since 
the end of XIX century, towards the joint-stock, limited liability companies 
and cooperatives, and since 2008 it was applied towards all types of limited 
liability legal entities (Ulmer, Habersack and Winter, 2008; Schmidt, 2010). 
The main purpose of this doctrine is to establish at law such duty for timely 
                                                          
32 In Western states, it is much wider used term “insolvency”, than “bankruptcy”, because of 
existing approach that bankruptcy is mainly related to criminal legal outcomes incurred as a 
result of insolvency. In USA, person, in respect to which the insolvency proceedings are 
being initiated, shall be firstly announced as insolvent, and subsequently, after the court 
ruling is adopted, it may be recognized as bankrupted. In UK, term “bankruptcy” is used, 
when speaking about natural persons, while in respect to legal entities it is used “insolvency” 
term. In German law there are two terms: Zahlungsunfähigkeit, which means insolvency, and 
Insolvenz, which might be interpreted in both meanings – insolvency or bankruptcy. In this 
country insolvency is one of the main legal grounds for initiating bankruptcy proceedings. In 
recent Russian laws, “insolvency” and “bankruptcy” terms are mainly used as synonyms. In 
Lithuanian laws it is being distinguished two types of insolvency – factual and legal. Factual 
insolvency – is understood as inability to satisfy company’s outstanding financial 
obligations; while legal insolvency – serves as a legal ground for initiating bankruptcy 
proceedings. For further information please see Kavalnė et al. (2009). 
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initiation of insolvency proceedings in respect to the company and 
imposition of liability for such breach of obligations thereof, seeking to 
protect rights and legal interests of company’s creditors (Bayer et al., 2009). 
In Germany, if directors do not submit timely notice regarding initiating of 
insolvency proceedings, the “old creditors” (ge. ‘die alten Gläubiger’) (i.e. 
those, who still were the company’s creditors before the company’s financial 
difficulties) have a right to demand losses because of the increase of extent 
of their claim incurred due to such delay (ge. Quotenschaden), while the 
“new creditors” (ge. ‘die neuen Gläubiger’) have a right to demand 
compensations due to circumstances that respective timely notice for 
initiating bankruptcy proceedings would prevent them from entering into 
respective contract with a company (ge. negatives Interesse) (Loos, 2006). 
Scientists remain at the opinion that director should be imposed certain 
liability for a breach of his duty to timely initiate insolvency proceedings 
against the company, if director’s fault in a form of negligence is proven 
(Ulmer, Habersack and Winter, 2008). It is being argued that lack of 
competency or negligence cannot be considered as justifiable reason for 
committing such default (Schmidt, 2010). Due to applicability of such 
doctrine, director may avoid liability only in such case if he timely submits 
respective application for initiating insolvency proceedings against the 
company. This duty in its sense is very strict and obliges directors to monitor 
company’s business activities and financial situation therein; as well it 
encourages directors to enforce available measures, when any financial 
difficulties are being observed. Thus, the basis for such doctrine is not a 
submission of an application for initiating insolvency proceedings, but 
implementation of so called ‘going concern principle’, i.e. constant 
assessment of company’s financial status, inspection and supervision thereof, 
in order to, as earlier as possible, observe any symptoms of upcoming crisis 
and enforce efficient preventive measures for rectifying such situation and 
avoiding insolvency proceedings within a company (Veil, 2006). Such duty 
for initiating insolvency proceedings arises, when based on the company’s 
financial statements; it is observed that the company is not capable to 
accumulate sufficient cash flows required for settlement of their payment 
obligations (Schillig, 2010). This approach is being supported by the fact that 
a director may be also equally liable for a breach of his fiduciary duty if such 
application has been submitted too early (Bayer et al., 2009). This liability 
may be also imposed thereupon if such director has all relevant knowledge 
on company’s economical and financial status, but he expects that the 
company still be capable to further carry out its business activities (Bayer et 
al., 2009). Thus, this doctrine is based on the implementation of procedures 
required for receipt of an adequate business information and decision-
making. 
European Scientific Journal   June 2014 edition vol.10, No.16   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
119 
This doctrine was criticized, at first, for reasons that stipulating such 
liability for respective default in respect to initiating insolvency proceedings 
in a timely manner, creditors’ legal interests are only indirectly protected, 
due to the fact that in such case company’s but not creditors’ assets are 
defended, as well as, in the event of breach by the director to timely initiate 
insolvency proceedings, only the company itself acquires the legal right to 
file a lawsuits against its directors, aimed at demanding compensation of 
losses incurred as a result of such default (Altmeppen and Wilhelm, 1999). 
Moreover, critics emphasizes, that such strict duty to submit application on 
initiating insolvency proceedings means that even certain promising business 
activities might get liquidated (Schillig, 2010). They do emphasize that the 
same purpose might be achieved by enforcing other legal measures, for 
instance, stipulating common duty, obliging directors to enforce all legal 
actions, seeking to minimize losses of company’s creditors, if there are no 
reasonable perspectives for continuance of the company’s business activities; 
company’s creditors can be also protected by statutory restrictions, 
preventing embezzlement of corporate assets in the event company has 
financial problems (Schillig, 2010). Finally, critics have doubts with regard 
to efficiency of implementation of such duty, as in practice it is rather 
difficult to observe a moment, when company becomes insolvent and its 
director incurs such liability to apply to court on the initiation of insolvency 
proceedings. In each case it depends on subjective assessments and 
prognostic estimates that are not easily being determined ex post (Schall, 
2009). 
Doctrine of ‘deepening insolvency’ is new and still developing 
doctrine, which in the end of XX century was firstly elaborated and used by 
U.S. courts (Colasacco, 2009). Primarily, it was based on the fact that not 
only directors but also managers of lower level, such as legal and financial 
advisors, auditors, insurers and creditors should be also held responsible for 
the continuance of company’s activities, when receiving or granting any 
additional loans thereto and, subsequently, increasing the amount of the 
company’s losses (Schillig, 2010). One of the first cases, where doctrine of 
‘deepening insolvency’ has been introduced and applied is the case In re 
Investors Funding Corporation of New York Securities Litigation, where 
New York Municipal Court stated that continuance of the company’s 
activities when certain circumstances have occurred might be detrimental to 
the company. Term ‘deepening insolvency’ has been firstly used in case 
Schacht v Brown, where the court has resolved, that continuance of the 
company’s activities, upon undertaking supplementary debt obligations is 
always considered harmful to the company. In case Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors v Lafferty, the court stated that even in situation, when 
the company’s debt exceeds the real market value of its assets, the respective 
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capital thereof might have certain value and such fraudulent and hidden debt 
undertaking might be detrimental thereupon. Later on, courts have expanded 
such term ‘deepening insolvency’; upon determining that such liability might 
be imposed not only due to ‘fraudulent’ but also as a result of certain 
‘negligent’ behavior. In case In re LTV Steel Company, Inc. it has been 
resolved that defendant might incur liability for ‘deepening insolvency’, 
when based on his actions the company’s activities are being continued in a 
fraudulent or negligent manner, subsequently resulting in increase of 
company’s debts and creditors’ losses. Moreover, it is emphasized, that such 
amount of reimbursable losses might be calculated based on the extent of 
increased undertakings, reduction of real market value of company’s assets 
and amount of the company’s lost profit (Thabault v Chait, 2008). 
Furthermore it is stated, that such supplemental debt undertakings, incurred 
after the company became insolvent, might be also attributed to the 
company’s losses (In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc., 2001). 
Critics of ‘deepening insolvency’ doctrine state that such doctrine 
could be considered excessive, due to the fact that for imposition thereof it is 
required to undertake fraudulent and hidden actions, while in the legal 
system it is already known and foreseen respective possibilities to file 
lawsuits for fraud and manipulations with securities (Thompson, 2007). 
Moreover, it is argued that such doctrine overall contradicts to the main 
principles of the company law as it opposes to the business judgement rule 
(Thompson, 2007). M. Schillig states, that pursuant to the business 
judgement rule, directors could only be exempted from the civil liability 
when they adopt decisions being extensively informed, acting in a due 
manner and reasonably believing that this decision complies with the best 
interests of the company (Schillig, 2010). Pursuant to this author, when a 
company is in state of insolvency or near becoming insolvent, and its 
directors are fully informed that their adopted decisions might be harmful to 
the company, in such event if they do not submit application for the initiating 
of insolvency proceedings, they should be imposed the relevant civil 
liability. The company’s directors are not allowed ‘to close their eyes’ on the 
occurred situation that should be obvious to the reasonable director who 
must realistically assess the real consequences of his actions or inactivity 
(Cieri, Ganske and Lennox, 1999). This approach is followed in case practice 
of Delaware courts, where in many cases it has been resolved that if the 
board of directors of such insolvent company implements certain business 
strategy believing that it will cause an increase of the company’s value, 
although as a result thereof the company incurs its further losses, directors 
will be exempted from the applicable civil liability thereupon by applying 
the business judgement rule (Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Billett, 
2007). Vice versa, it could be assumed that the damage caused to the 
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company, declining respective opportunities to fight for the company’s 
further existence, or delaying application of the appropriate actions, seeking 
to assist the company, might cause event more loss, unless such actions 
could mean embezzlement of the company’s assets (In re Parmalat 
Securities Litigation, 2007). However, Delaware courts do consider such 
‘deepening insolvency’ doctrine as a doctrine for compensation of losses in 
the event of breach of fiduciary duties (In re The Brown Schools, 2008; etc.). 
Moreover, the court in case Thabault v Chait has emphasized that any 
increase of liabilities shall be deemed harmful to the company, moreover, 
claimants are given sufficient legal measures for proving causality between 
such negligent director’s actions and company’s incurred damage. In 
reference to the fact that Delaware law has a great impact on U.S. legal 
system, some authors state that such Delaware approach in respect to 
‘deepening insolvency’ doctrine might result in withdrawal of this doctrine in 
other USA States (Harner and Brighton, 2008). 
In Lithuanian legal system, same as in Germany dominates a doctrine 
of ‘liability for delaying insolvency proceedings’, which is recognized both 
in the laws and in court practise (for example, Resolution of Supreme Court 
of Lithuania adopted in civil case No. 3K-3-496/2013, 2013). In Article 8(1) 
of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Lithuania (the 
“Enterprise Bankruptcy Law”) it is foreseen an obligation of the company’s 
owner and director to submit application to the court regarding initiating of 
bankruptcy proceedings, when the following circumstances occur: (i) a 
company is or will not be able to satisfy claims of creditor (creditors) and he 
(they) did not themselves apply to the court with a bankruptcy claim or (ii) a 
company publicly announced or otherwise informed the creditor (creditors) 
that it is not able or does not intend to settle its payment obligations thereto. 
Part 4 of the same Article of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law mandatory 
provides that the company’s manager or other person authorized to adopt the 
respective decision on behalf of a company, must compensate losses which 
creditors suffered due to such company’s delay to submit application for 
initiating bankruptcy proceedings. Although this provision has entered into 
force only as of 1 July 2008, the Supreme Court of Lithuania has already 
resolved even before that date, i.e. when either version of the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law has been in force, that the company’s director has a duty to 
compensate creditors’ losses (although that is not directly stipulated under 
the law) (Resolution adopted in civil case No. 3K-3-228/2011, 2011). 
Therefore, doctrine of ‘liability for delaying insolvency proceedings’ in 
Lithuania was enforced since the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was enacted, i. 
e. since 20 March 2001. In Lithuania, same as in Germany and other states, 
where such doctrine is applied (for instance, Austria, Switzerland, France 
and others (Kraakman et al., 2009)), creditors are not entitled to directly, i.e. 
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in their own name, submitting to the court a lawsuit against the head of the 
company for reimbursement of their incurred losses, as it is held that such 
rights are granted only to the bankruptcy administrator, in charge of 
defending all company’s creditors interests (Article 11(3)(14) of the 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law), along with the interest of the bankrupt 
company (Resolution of the Supreme Court of Lithuania adopted in civil 
case No. 3K-3-130/2011). Upon awarding reimbursement of damages in 
favor of the company, all received amounts shall be used pro rata to satisfy 
claims of all approved creditors, respecting the order and terms for 
satisfaction of creditors’ claims as specified in Article 35 of the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law. The appropriate creditor might apply to the court for 
compensation of damages only by indirect claim (Article 6.68 of the Civil 
Code), initiating lawsuit in the name of the bankrupt company if such 
company (its administrator) would not enforce such right to claim damage 
compensation. In such case, upon satisfying the aforementioned indirect 
lawsuit, all demanded assets would get offset against the property of the 
bankrupt company and used for satisfying all creditor claims (Article 6.68(5) 
of the Civil Code). 
In a legal doctrine it is recognized that timely submission before the 
court and further not delayed bankruptcy proceedings should protect 
creditors’ rights and at least partly compensate their damages suffered due to 
unsatisfied undertakings from the bankrupt company’s assets, therefore, such 
application submitted in timely manner should be a standard of due behavior 
by the company’s owner or director in the situation of imminent bankruptcy 
(Kavalnė et al., 2009). Although it must be taken into account that even in 
the applicable Enterprise Bankruptcy Law such imminent insolvency is not 
expressis verbis determined as a basis of initiating bankruptcy proceedings, 
but implications of such regulation must be noticed as this law explicitly 
provides that the head of a company must apply to the court with a 
bankruptcy claim against the company not only when a company is not able 
to settle payments towards the creditors, but also, when it is obvious, that it 
will not be capable to do so in the future. Scientists define ‘imminent 
insolvency’ as a status when a debtor is able to satisfy its current obligations, 
but it will not be possibly capable to satisfy present or future undertakings, 
after they become due (Kavalnė and Norkus, 2011). Thus, an imminent 
insolvency from a present insolvency differs by only fact that not present but 
future situation that will occur when payment obligations become due is 
being assessed. However, the scientists argue that due the fact that the law 
does not provide neither the term of the imminent insolvency, nor criteria for 
determination of such status, then, in the event of failure to apply to the court 
for initiating of bankruptcy proceedings against the company by the owner or 
director thereof in case of possible imminent insolvency would not imply 
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any breach of statutory requirements (Kavalnė and Norkus, 2011). We do not 
agree with such approach, as the law explicitly stipulates a duty to apply to 
the court, when it is obvious that in the future a company will not be able to 
settle up with the creditors, however, we agree that the law must clearly 
determine the definition of an imminent insolvency, as well as criteria for its 
assessment. 
 
Personal Liability of Directors after Company’s Liquidation 
Although the Supreme Court of Lithuania has determined a common 
rule that a civil liability of directors might be imposed against both: a 
company, when a director is acting against interests of a company, and a 
third party, when a director is acting in breach of limitations, granted by 
certain warranties issued for the benefit of such third party (Resolution 
adopted in civil case No. 3K-7-266/2006, 2006), however, this rule can be 
further explicated upon distinguishing three steps, visualized in Table 1 
hereunder. 
Table 1. The Limits of Limited Liability for Company Directors 
  
 
 
 
 
Personal 
liability 
against company against company against creditors 
Company’s 
action 
direct 
(submitted by 
shareholders - so-
called “derivative 
action”) 
direct 
(submitted by 
bankruptcy 
administrator) 
 
‒ 
Creditor’s 
action 
indirect indirect direct 
 
As it can be noticed from the Table 1 hereinabove, the company’s 
directors are entitled to the limited liability defense, unless due to their unjust 
actions it has been caused any damage to the company or a respective third 
party. However, the direct liability against the third parties is possible only 
after the completion of the company’s liquidation procedures, as the third 
parties are entitled only to the indirect lawsuit in the name of a company. 
This is repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court of Lithuania, emphasizing 
that following the opening of a bankruptcy proceedings against the defendant 
(company), then the respective creditor’s claims are not satisfied thereunder, 
the right to submit claim for compensation of losses against the natural 
persons that have been comprising management bodies of the bankrupt 
company remains even after the bankruptcy proceedings are completed, 
Company is solvent Company is insolvent Company is liquidated 
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respectively, the court will have to decide, whether there are conditions for 
civil liability against the defendant of such claim (Resolutions adopted in 
civil cases No. 3K-3-19/2012, 2012 and No. 3K-3-234/2013, 2013). At the 
same time the court has emphasized, that retaining of such right to file a 
claim against the company’s director that is responsible for incurred losses 
after the company is liquidated due to its bankruptcy, shall mean protection 
of creditor’s legal interests, real existence of creditor’s subjective rights and 
practical implementation thereof. Former members of the bankrupt 
company’s management bodies may be held liable for caused damages, 
incurred due to the company’s failure to fulfill obligations towards the 
creditors, when it is proven that they personally or through exercising their 
decision right has adopted respective business decisions that did not comply 
to the ordinary business practice and/or contradicts to the requirements 
stipulated at law or company’s incorporation documents which had caused 
the company’s insolvency, and as a result thereof the company was not able 
to settle up with its creditors. Civil liability of persons that comprised 
respective management bodies of liquidated bankrupt company may be 
imposed not only in cases, when company’s capacity to fulfill contractual 
undertakings towards its creditors has been caused by the unlawful actions 
thereof that were determined as criminal acts under conviction documents 
(such as criminal charges, penal injunction), but also in cases, when a 
company’s insolvency and inability to fulfill payment obligations towards 
the creditors was a direct consequence of certain actions carried out by 
individuals comprising the company’s management bodies, provided certain 
liability conditions are being established (Resolution adopted in civil case 
No. 3K-3-214/2011, 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis provided in this article has shown that limited liability 
doctrine shall be applicable not only in respect to shareholders of a company, 
but also towards directors thereof. 
It was emphasised that limited liability defense shall be applicable on 
the directors in respect to both – contractual and tortious liability. However, 
such legal protection from the liability could be withdrawn, when a director 
commits illegal acts that cause damages to a company or to creditors thereof. 
In respect of creditors the liability of such director shall still be considered 
subsidiary, whereas a direct liability of the director may only arise against a 
company until its liquidation and only after the completion of liquidation 
proceedings – against the creditors whose claims remained unsatisfied. 
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